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that “there is no racism in Russia.” It reveals that Russia has a history of racism that it 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
On a crisp March evening in 2019 I walked into a cafebar in Vladivostok, Russia 
to research and write my final essay for the great power politics course I was taking while 
on an internship at Vladivostok State University. I regularly sat in this particular cafebar 
multiple times per week and was on a first name basis with every server and bartender. The 
atmosphere was relaxed, the food was delicious, and the proximity to the university was 
ideal for frequent visits. On this particular day, I was helping a few acquaintances 
(Aleksandr and Dmitri) with their English work as I wrote my final paper. After working 
for about half an hour, a third man, in his mid-40s, came over to the table to ask if any of 
us had a cigarette. Aleksandr and Dmitri said they were out and I told him I do not smoke. 
He continued small talk for about a minute with the three of us and then left to go ask 
someone else for a cigarette. After he left, Dmitri mentioned how the interaction was kind 
of strange, but Aleksandr replied saying that he had smoked outside of the cafebar with the 
man in the past and that he is a “good guy.” 
A few minutes later Aleksandr left to go buy cigarettes and then, as I later found 
out, smoked outside with this man. When they returned, the man followed Aleksandr to 
our table and asked me if I could do a one-armed pushup and handstand pushups. At this 
point the man stood too close to me and was constantly leaning on my bag, so I started to 
pretend that I understood less Russian than I do because I did not want to engage and Dmitri 
and Aleksandr started “translating” for me.  When I said that I can do a small amount of 
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those pushups he started saying that I am outrageous because he has a bad heart and can 
do 30 one-arm pushups and we are all young men and should be stronger than him. After 
about four minutes of this ridicule and further comparisons to the physicality of Russians 
and “my people,” he walked away and went back to sit with his belongings. 
About twenty more minutes later, the same man walked up to our table with a more 
determined look in his eyes, greeted Aleksandr, and then started shouting at me to go home. 
“Домой пошли! Пошли домой!” (“Go home!”) Each time he shouted he spat at my face, 
hair, and body and I acted as if I could not understand him; after about fifteen seconds of 
this spitting and shouting, Dmitri said, “He’s with us. He’s fine. You don’t understand.” 
But the man kept repeating it. Dmitri continued saying, “he’s with us” but the man ignored 
him, turned to me, and said, “Come to the bathroom with me, so I can show you something. 
Come take a piss.” Just as before, I continued acting as if I did not understand his Russian, 
so then he started acting out how to pee toward me so I could see what he was asking me 
to do. He kept saying, “тебе надо писать” (“you need to piss”) to which I finally replied, 
“I don’t need to go to the bathroom” and he said, “yes you do.” Then, as Dmitri tried to 
translate what the man was saying- thinking I actually did not understand- the older man 
started petting my head as if I were a dog and then wrapped his arm around my neck and 
grabbed me from the table. As he started cutting off my air, I instantly thought, ‘if I push 
this man off of me it could start a fight, in which the police would be called, and if I got 
arrested for fighting in a bar in a foreign country I could say “goodbye” to my dreams of 
working for the U.S. State Department. However, I can’t just let this man continue to choke 
me.’ 
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Luckily, about ten or fifteen seconds into this altercation, Dmitri stood, grabbed the 
man by the shoulders in a side hug, and led him outside to smoke, with Aleksandr following 
closely behind. 
I sat at the table alone for about ten minutes processing everything that had just 
happened while everyone around me continued eating and talking as if nothing abnormal 
had occurred. Dmitri returned and, acting as if nothing had happened, wanted to talk about 
American rap, about which I know very little. Aleksandr, who ran inside and said he was 
going to go on a walk with the older man, was gone for about 20 minutes and then came 
back asking me my room number. Dmitri had asked me this question when we first met for 
dinner so he replied saying, “he said he lives on the second floor,” but Aleksandr said to 
him in a hurried whisper that the older man wanted to know what room I lived in because 
“he knows the security guard” to my building. I ignored Aleksandr’s question and 
continued speaking with Dmitri about American rap culture for fifteen minutes. I 
eventually saw that the older man did not return to the cafebar and then went back to my 
room for the evening. 
This was not my first attack in the region; there had been other occurrences both in 
Vladivostok and in other cities in Russia and other former Soviet states in which I had 
lived. Though this vignette is not as bad as it could have been, it is the one that has bothered 
me most since my return from Russia because the man petted me and then choked me, as 
my “friends” sat and watched with smiles on their faces. 
Over the following weeks, I mentioned what happened to numerous people: 
classmates in the United States and Russia, internship colleagues, internship bosses, 
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graduate advisors in Texas, professors in Russia, dorm mothers in Russia, and numerous 
others, all of whom had one of two reactions. First, the Americans almost exclusively said 
some variation of, “that’s unfortunate, but of course that happened. It’s Russia, what did 
you expect?” Second, the Russians almost all responded with some variation of, “that’s 
odd, he must’ve been drunk or crazy or [insert adjectival excuse here]. It can’t be because 
of your race, there’s no racism in Russia. You should know that, you come from the United 
States where there is racism everywhere.” 
Both of these responses are indicative of two larger, opposing narratives 
surrounding the presence and pervasiveness of race in Russia. The former represents an 
apparent ‘common knowledge’ about racism in Russia from the United States and the 
West, even though most Americans and Westerners cannot name a particular instance or 
statistical number of racial attacks in Russia. This assumption is rooted in the belief that 
Russia’s race relations are so apparent that spending time and intellectual effort evaluating 
their prevalence is superfluous. Indeed, upon choosing this project and initially finding few 
secondary sources on the topic, a professor responded by saying, “perhaps the reason no 
one has researched this topic is because it does not matter.” 
The latter response, from the Russian perspective, echoes a very common belief 
that there truly is no racism in the Russian Federation. Notwithstanding the recent 
proliferation of academic studies, ethnographic research, and organizations dedicated to 
documenting and analyzing the presence of overt racism and race-based hate crimes in the 
last two decades, this belief is held by individuals in different sectors of society, from those 
in the education system to those working for the Russian state. For example, after the 
 5 
murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis and the subsequent protests and riots in the United 
States and around the world in solidarity, Vladimir Putin publicly spoke about the situation 
and stated that Russia does not have “those problems.”1 But, as seen through the previously 
mentioned academic studies, ethnographic research and organizations such as the SOVA 
Center, Russia does have a problem with racism and racial hierarchies. In fact, there are 
popular groups that openly advocate for both the preservation and strengthening of these 
hierarchies within the Russian Federation.  
How, then, can the Russian government confidently say that there is no racism in 
Russia while these groups openly exist and there are numerous detailed accounts of racist 
attacks across the Russian Federation? Where does the belief that there is ‘no racism in 
Russia’ come from and how is it so widely believed today within Russia? Why is there a 
tendency for the Russian state and the Russian media to compare Russia with the United 
States whenever confronted with the ideas of race and racism within their own country? 
Which of the opposing narratives I received after my attack in Vladivostok is most 
accurate, or are they both wrong? 
This thesis attempts to answer these questions by focusing specifically on the 
narratives of race throughout Russian history, how they have informed contemporary 
Russia’s relationship with the concept of race, and how the boundaries and manifestations 
of racism operate in contemporary Russia. 
 
1  The Moscow Times, “Putin Criticizes U.S. Coronavirus Response, Condemns 'Mayhem and Rioting' at 




Before the turn of the century, there was a common belief that Russia’s experience 
with race was immune to the racism that plagued other European empires because there 
was no formal use of race as a categorical concept in Russian academia or state policies. 
However, after the fall of the Soviet Union scholars began to further research the presence 
of race as a concept in Russian history and found that the Russian experience is different 
from its contemporary counterparts, but no more immune to the problems of racism than 
the American or German experiences. Believing that Russia is exceptional and immune to 
the problems of racism and racial hierarchies presumes both a common understanding and 
historical usage of race by the rest of the world from which Russia was excluded. However, 
this is incorrect because every European empire had a different relationship with race 
internally as well as within their colonies, and they developed different social stratifications 
following these imperial relationships; for example, the United States, South Africa, and 
Brazil all created their societies around a specific understanding of race that derived from 
their imperial pasts. 
Russia, therefore, is not special in its understanding of race. Its particular 
understanding is one of numerous racial logics that evolved throughout the course of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that have all manifested divergently in the twenty-
first century. Imperial Russia never formally dealt with the concept of race as their 
European and American counterparts did; but they developed a hierarchy of social 
belonging on the basis of biological difference that, at the time, held ethnic Russians above 
everyone else and persecuted those who failed to reaffirm this dynamic.  
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After the Bolshevik Revolution and the fall of the imperial regime, the Soviet Union 
had a domestic racial logic that was adapted from the imperial regime and a foreign racial 
logic that they weaponized against their enemies in the West. Internally, there was a 
hierarchy of superiority based on the perceived development of the citizens in the various 
national regions and republics. Russkiy culture, language, and physical appearance were 
the top of this hierarchy and all other nationalities were placed on this hierarchy contingent 
upon their cultural, linguistic, and biological proximity to the russkie. There was a deep 
assumption that race was malleable, so individuals could therefore change their race if they 
changed their behavior and cultural traits. For example, there was debate around whether 
or not russkie who migrated to Siberia had “gone native” whilst living among the “savage” 
races native to the region.2 These people were believed to have changed their identity from 
the “civilized” russkiy into some amalgamation of civilized savagery.3 
In the role of foreign policy, instead of introducing formal racial concepts into 
society as a way to divide the population, the Soviet Union introduced various concepts to 
its society as a way to promote ‘anti-racism.’ That is, in order to distance itself from and 
internationally criticize the United States throughout the twentieth century, and especially 
during the Civil Rights era, the Soviet leadership introduced formal racial concepts and 
ideals of racial equality as a way to unite society under socialism, rather than divide it under 
capitalism. On the African continent and throughout southeast Asia, the Soviet Union 
 
2  David Rainbow, “Racial ‘Degeneration’ and Siberian Regionalism in the Late Imperial Period,” in 
Ideologies of Race: Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union in Global Context(Montreal ; Kingston ; London 
; Chicago: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2019), pp. 179-207. 
3 Ibid. 
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portrayed socialism and communism as the non-racist alternative to the United States, 
which actively treated its own black and brown citizens with violence and contempt. For 
example, the march that became known as “Bloody Sunday” in Selma, Alabama in 1965 
became strong fodder for anti-capitalist propaganda both within the Soviet Union and in 
other countries, such as Vietnam, that became centers of proxy wars between the two 
superpowers. 
At the same time, the Soviet leadership opened its borders to students from across 
Africa in a policy meant to solidify Africa as a socialist continent by spreading Marxist 
revolutionary ideology as a solution to the consequences of Western imperialism and 
racism. However, despite this Soviet propaganda, the African students who travelled 
behind the Iron Curtain were not popular among native citizens in the Soviet Union. For 
example, Soviet men struggled to accept the presence of these visual others as Soviet 
women’s fascination with them increased. African men with Soviet girlfriends were 
attacked and sometimes murdered by Soviet men who felt that the African men encroached 
on their romantic territory and did not belong.4 
There are numerous examples of tension and violence between African students 
and Soviet citizens throughout the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s.5 Though the relationship between 
African students and the citizenry during the Soviet Union was better than between African 
(and African-American) students and the citizenry during the Russian Federation, there 
 
4  Julie HESSLER, “Death of an African Student in Moscow,” Cahiers du monde russe. Russie - Empire 




were still severe problems for African students during the Soviet period.6 This struggle in 
itself demonstrates at least the presence of a visible racial hierarchy during the Soviet 
Union, though not one as pervasive as other societies. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia became a nation of chaotic 
leadership, unreliable communication, and inconsistent access to necessary resources such 
as water and electricity in certain regions of the country. Only those who were quickly able 
to privatize ownership over vital areas of the Russian economy (for example, oil, machine 
manufacturing, auto manufacturing, etc.) successfully traversed this struggle for 
resources.7 The vast majority of the former Soviet citizenry was left to compete with one 
another over these necessities. As the resources remained scarce throughout the 1990s, 
people fought over who deserved a portion of these resources and who was only taking 
away from the Russian people. Non-Russian ‘others’ became competition for resources 
and a main reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union.8 Some believed that the union 
collapsed because it tried to support the advancement of other countries while its own 
society was failing. But instead of placing the responsibility solely with those in charge, 
many disillusioned citizens blamed the foreigners from those countries who benefited from 
 
6  Kevin O'Flynn, “Russia's Black Community And The Obama Effect,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty 
(Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, July 7, 2009), 
https://www.rferl.org/a/For_Russian_Blacks_Obama_Visit_Stirs_Special_Interest/1770531.html. 
7  Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Andrew B. Wachtel, “Post-Soviet Russia,” Encyclopædia Britannica 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., August 8, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/place/Russia/Post-Soviet-
Russia. 
8  Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and 
Authoritarianism 2000-2015(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017). 
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the Soviet Union’s political openness- i.e., immigrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia 
and the African students studying at Russian universities.9 
When Vladimir Putin rose to power and stabilized Russian society after this chaotic 
decade, he galvanized the hatred of ‘others’ that had become prevalent in Russia and 
aligned Russian morality, norms, and global strategy with russkiy10 culture. Most apparent 
of which was his reinvigoration of the Eurasianism ideology: the belief that Russia is 
neither European or Asian, but the perfect mix of both that is destined to expand its 
territory, recreate the Soviet empire, and undermine Western liberalism that is the antithesis 
of the Russian identity.11 Chief among his intellectual advisors is Alexander Dugin who 
takes this idea further and asserts that nerusskaya (non-Russian) peoples are below the 
russkie and that liberalism is an attack on collective identity; that is, an attack on russkiy 
identity that wishes to keep the russkie from achieving their rightful place above everyone 
else. Dugin’s anti-liberal, superiority perspective is widely referred to as Duginism.12 
These ideologies are important for this study because they are supported by the 
Russian government and call for a societal distrust of anyone and anything nerusskaya in 
origin, including people. Upon initial exposure, one would most probably consider these 
ideologies to be rooted in racialized hierarchies and that the Russian government is 
 
9 Ibid. 
10 It is important to note that in the Russian language, there are two words that translate to the English 
word “Russian.” Russkiy (russkiy adj. russkie noun pl.) refers to those who are ethnically Russian and 
Rossiyskiy (rossiyskiy adj. Rossiyskie noun pl.) refers to those who are citizens of the Russian Federation. 
The emphasis of russkiy by the actors in this study demonstrates how these ideas of collective identity are 
tied to the Russian ethnic identity rather than a general Russian federal identity. 




blatantly lying when they claim there is no racism in Russia. But these ideologies are not 
considered racist in Russia because they portray russkiy as a national identity that they 
believe is distinct from a racial identity. In this respect, to be pro-russkiy and anti-everyone 
else is nationalist, not racist. Advocating for a hierarchy in which the russkie are dominant 
is viewed as patriotic as a result of the anti-‘other’ logic that became popular during the 
1990s and under Vladimir Putin, and any criticism against this tactic is an attack on the 
Russian way of life. 
This allows the contemporary Russian government to operate within a quasi-state 
of cognitive dissonance. It can claim that there is no racism in Russia because Russia does 
not have the same racial problems as the United States, Western Europe, Latin America, 
etc. while also openly proclaiming ‘Russia for Russkie’ because the federal identity of 
Russia is closely connected to russkiy identity. Any attack on this contradiction is treated 
as an attack on the core of Russia itself; changing this dynamic is equated with changing 
the heart and soul of Russia and therefore is never seriously evaluated for prejudices or 
adjusted for improvement. 
Using this dynamic, this thesis attempts to explain how the claim that there is no 
racism in Russia is so widely believed while the calls for russkiy superiority over others is 
so explicit. By highlighting major nationalist groups in the Russian Federation and 
connecting their actions and beliefs to the larger Russian narrative of race, I argue that the 
Russian state has used the country’s historical confusion with formal racial concepts to 
assert a russkiy-superior racial hierarchy through the language of racelessness. This multi 
century-long manipulation of logic has allowed for contemporary white nationalist groups 
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in the Russian Federation to gain public support and commit numerous acts of violence in 
the name of nationalism while allowing the state to maintain that the country itself does 
not have a problem with racism.  
Chapter one outlines the historical understanding of race and racial practices 
throughout Russian history and finds that race, rasa, was introduced alongside nationality 
and ethnicity into Imperial Russia and that the various terms used to describe the same or 
slightly different ideas- for example, plemia, poroda, and narod- all became confused and 
then amalgamated in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries as the empire was 
waning. Then, under Soviet leadership, the same syntactic confusion surrounding race from 
imperial times was maintained as the concept of race became a tool of anti-Westernism. 
The Soviets actively upheld social hierarchies along biological lines just as their Western 
foes, but the use of the word ‘race’ to describe these hierarchies was never introduced into 
the Soviet system, therefore they touted a feigned ethical superiority over the United States 
while practicing the same behavior. 
Chapter two profiles five of the most prominent white nationalist groups in the 
Russian Federation from the past decade (2010-’20). Each group’s profile answers the 
following questions: 1) Who are they? 2) Where are they based? 3) What is their core 
ideology? 4) What is their online and social media presence, if any? 5) For which social 
hierarchies do they advocate? These groups range from neo-Nazi organizations to 
imperialist paramilitary training groups, so there are countless differences amongst them. 
But this chapter finds that, through all of these differences, all five groups have two ideas 
in common: their belief that Russians, russkie, belong at the peak of every social hierarchy 
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and their usage of nationality to assert these hierarchies. For each group, subjugating 
domestic national minorities in order to maintain russkiy dominance is the natural course 
of governance for the Russian Federation. These hierarchies, they believe, must be upheld 
to maintain russkiy purity and the future dominance of Russia on a global scale. 
Chapter three draws a connection between contemporary Russian white 
nationalism and global white nationalism. Russia is not unique insofar as its society 
operates outside of the purview of race. Understanding the historical trajectory of racial 
practices in Russia demonstrates how the actions of Russian leadership throughout history 
allowed for the assumption that russkiy represents a quintessential ‘Russianness,’ just as 
whiteness in the United States represents a quintessential ‘Americanness.’ When we 
remove ourselves from the importance of specific vocabulary and focus on the structural 
formations of human hierarchy, we see that Russia, the United States, Brazil, Germany, 
etc. follow a similar pattern of racial logic. Each adopted a similar conceptual framework 
for justifying their particular racial hierarchies; or, in other words, all of these states are 
racist, but in their own way. 
METHODOLOGY 
 This thesis uses qualitative methods as quantitative methods alone are not sufficient 
for answering any of the questions posed above. This study is not as concerned with how 
many national minorities are attacked by white nationalists in Russia or how many 
members each group has in comparison to the others; rather, it is more concerned with the 
prevalence of the perception of Russian superiority and how the people who subscribe to 
 14 
this ideology also widely believe that it is not racist, but strictly nationalist. This study 
focuses on the sentiments of white nationalism, such as victimhood (feelings of lost 
economic opportunity or a subjugated role in society as a result of the presence of ‘others’), 
feelings of loss, and how these sentiments are connected to global white nationalism and 
white supremacy. To this end, qualitative methodologies more effectively capture the 
sentiments and underlying meanings behind certain actions and behaviors. 
 The primary qualitative method used was content analysis. I visited these groups’ 
official websites, if available, followed their social media accounts for several months, 
analyzed Russian media sources pertaining to these groups, and read interviews given from 
various national minorities about their experiences living in the Soviet Union and Russian 
Federation. As stated above, I found that these so-called nationalist groups provide varying 
motivations for their hierarchical beliefs, but I also found a few ways in which these 
groups’ motivations overlapped. 
 Using this overlap, I place these groups within the context of Russia’s historical 
understanding of race to demonstrate the logical manifestation of these groups; and I 
compare them to global racism and show how the processes of Russian racism mirror the 
processes of racism in other societies around the world. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
For both academics and policymakers this topic is important because as we get lost 
in the details of race terminology, the rhetoric, actions, and intentions surrounding it 
become less important. The concept of race does not speak to one static idea, but rather is 
fluid, and requires a contextual and historical framing, which is why this thesis avoids any 
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formal definition of the term. Creating policy under the guise of race being one particular 
idea allows various actors to justify their prejudices in a seemingly infinite number of ways 
as they claim to be non-racist while following racist logic and administering racist 
practices. Subscribing only to a singular definition or popular manifestation of race creates 
at best a dishonest academic field and at worst a violent racialized state. It is our 
responsibility as intellectuals and leaders to understand that aspects of life are seldom as 
they appear on the surface and this includes manifestations of race.  
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Chapter II: Historical Racial Logic in Russia 
Race and racism do not have singular definitions that are applicable to every person 
in every culture around the world. Each society has its own historical relationship with race 
that has shifted and influenced its contemporary treatment of the concept, both 
academically and discursively. Leading critical race scholar, David Theo Goldberg, coined 
the term “racial regionalization” in his book, The Threat of Race where he discusses 
“regionalized racisms” as  phenomena demographically, historically, conceptually, and 
systemically distinct from one another based on the geographic context of the society in 
question. He argues that these geographic differences result in diverging securitization 
narratives and objectives for different groups of people and that race and racism fall within 
this larger framework of security needs.13 
While each nation or empire’s usage of racial concepts varied throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they all discursively adopted the ambiguity of the 
French scientific discourses that defined race as a combination of physical, moral, 
intellectual, and cultural features, all of which were attained through blood and heredity. 
But, with this understanding, Finns, Celts, Semites, and Slavs are all considered different 
races, just as Kenyans and Japanese are; and most of these groups can simultaneously be 
considered nations depending on the era and country making the categorization.14 The 
imprecision and opaqueness of boundaries around race allowed for each society to create 
 
13  Goldberg, David Theo. “Racial Europeanization.” The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial 
Neoliberalism, 151–98. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 
14  Reynaud-Paligot, “Construction and Circulation of the Notion of ‘Race’ in the Nineteenth Century,” 
87-99. 
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their own understanding and social hierarchies based on various features of this broad 
concept. 
There was a common idea among Soviet scholars that the Soviet Union was a 
raceless society and not directly shaped by the intricacies of racial logic because its society 
was not as racially heterogeneous as other infamous racialized societies around the world 
(South Africa, Brazil, United States, etc.). In a special 2002 publication of the Slavic 
Review journal, numerous scholars examined the presence of race in pre-revolutionary 
Russia, the former Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation. Two of the most influential 
contributions that challenged the ‘raceless’ assumption came from historian Eric Weitz and 
anthropologist Alaina Lemon as they dealt with the conceptual manifestations of race in 
the region and developed a key distinction for understanding the functionality of global 
racism: race as a concept vs. race as practice. 
Weitz stated that the relationship between categories of ‘nation’ and ‘race’ were 
fluid. He advised scholars of pre-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union to see race as 
“practice,” that is, as “policies exercised by states that structure or ascribe identity”15 in 
one of two ways: actions taken against bodies and actions taken against identities. The 
latter represents an effort by Soviet leadership to practice racial politics “despite the 
absence of an articulated racial ideology” under Soviet rule.16 Lemon uses this same idea 
but argues that ascribing identity is “not only a ‘mark’ of practice, nor just a brake on 
 
15  Weitz, Eric D. “Racial Politics without the Concept of Race: Reevaluating Soviet Ethnic and National 
Purges.” Slavic Review. 61, no. 1 (2002): 1–29. https://doi.org/10.2307/2696978. 
16  Lemon, Alaina. “Without a ‘Concept’? Race as Discursive Practice.” Slavic Review. 61, no. 1 (2002): 
54–61. https://doi.org/10.2307/2696981. 
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practice, but is a practice among others.” She rejects the assumption that the absence of 
explicit racial ideological language means that Russian and Soviet policymakers had no 
concept of race. Instead, she states that looking for race concepts can be misleading because 
“races are not things to be named. [They] exist only insofar as people deploy racializing 
criteria of difference to organize social relations.”17 For Lemon, the employment of the 
term ‘race’ or the use of racial terminology are not as significant compared to how a society 
codifies social difference, regardless of which official concepts are used. 
 This chapter’s analysis operates within the distinction of race as a concept vs. race 
as practice. Russia’s regionalized racism does not include the formal racial concepts that 
are used in other societies around the world. Russian racism was developed through a maze 
of terminological confusion and an absence of clear, determinable boundaries between 
race, nation, and ethnicity. As a result, the Soviet Union and Russian Federation employed 
language that was seemingly about equality and created a system of feigned racial 
ignorance in which white nationalist groups have successfully used non-racial terminology 
to cloak their racism in ultranationalist fervor. 
The following chapter briefly details the Russian experience with these concepts 
and how the nationalist groups in focus are a logical manifestation of the terminological 
inconsistencies of these ideas in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This is by no 




instead, this section should be read as an overview of how Russian actors viewed these 
concepts and the shifts in their usage over time. 
 
HISTORY OF NATIONAL RACIALIZATION 
Imperial Russia 
As race and racial concepts developed in Western Europe and the United States (the 
connection of biological difference to intellectual capacity, molding beauty standards 
around European features, etc.), the same process was occurring in the Russian Empire 
with a slightly different trajectory. Russian Studies scholar Vera Tolz clearly outlines the 
construction of race, ethnicity, and nationhood in Imperial Russia. 
The official term “race,” rasa, was introduced to the Russian vernacular from the 
French in the 1830s; but even though the widespread understanding was that a race was a 
group of people with shared physical characteristics, its usage in Russia, much like the rest 
of the world at the time, was not consistent. For example, in Russian society there were 
“races of shepherds and seafarers” and a debate of “free races [vs] those destined for 
slavery;” and even moral definitions that denoted races as being “proud, treacherous, and 
spineless.”18 
In addition to this confusion around the use of ‘race,’ there were two words 
commonly used in Imperial Russia that also meant race: poroda (breed or stock) and plemia 
 
18  Rainbow, David, and Vera Tolz. “Constructing Race, Ethnicity, and Nationhood in Imperial Russia: 
Issues and Misconceptions.” Essay. In Ideologies of Race: Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union in Global 
Context, 32. Montreal ; Kingston ; London ; Chicago: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2019. 
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(tribe). According to Vladimir Dal’s dictionary at the time, there were five primary groups 
of plemia: white (Europe and the Caucasus), yellow (Asia), red (the Americas), brown 
(Polynesia), and black (Africa).19 In addition to this categorization, the dictionary also 
shows that both plemia and poroda were used to mean nationality as well. For example, 
one of the definitions of plemia was “narod, iazyk (language), [and] a local community” 
while one of the definitions of poroda was “narodnost’, as in the expressions ‘German or 
English race,’ nemetskaia, angliiskaia poroda.”20 
This terminological maze became so entrenched by the late-nineteenth century that 
most Russians, even the scholars of race science, found it difficult to differentiate between 
“the groups defined by physical features and those defined through language and other 
cultural characteristics.” As a result, by the turn of the twentieth century, “rather than 
achieving a clearer separation of the concept of race from the most important notion of 
community belonging- the nation- the understanding of the latter began to be further 
racialized.”21 In other words, rather than separating race from nation, the two became even 
more interconnected through the haze of this etymological confusion. 
From here, it is conceivable how race, ethnicity, and nationhood were all developed 
as a single conceptual field in Imperial Russia. Three eighteenth century scholars epitomize 
the blurred lines between rasa, poroda, and plemia in Russian discourse. Historian Ivan 
Boltin argued that all tribes and peoples derived from their own poroda, each poroda had 
 
19 Ibid. 
20  Dal, Tolkovyi Slovar’ zhivago velikorusskogo iazyka, vol. III, 124, 319. 
21  Rainbow & Tolz, 32. 
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different origins, and that there is a hierarchy amongst the different groups. As certain 
scholars, professors, and school teachers began using these terms interchangeably, Boltin’s 
three arguments held true for all.  
The most apparent conflation of Boltin’s use of poroda and the use of plemia was 
with Aleksei Lovetskii, professor of natural sciences at Moscow University in the mid-
nineteenth century, where he taught about plemena in a hierarchy of civilization, in which 
blacks were at the bottom, Europeans at the top, and Slavs as the most idyllic group within 
the hierarchy that were “rapidly moving toward the state of perfection.”22 In his teachings, 
he maintained the same ideas as Boltin that these groups have differing origins and that 
these origins are the source of social hierarchies, but he explicitly uses plemia and not 
poroda to make this point. 
In the wake of these two scholars’ work, debates surrounding the meaning and 
boundaries of the Russian identity plagued society and the term narodnost’ was used by 
ethnographers to mean “a close link between people’s physical features, innate cultural and 
moral characteristics, and their way of life.”23 At this time, leading ethnographer Nikolai 
Nadezhdin reaffirmed the idea that race and nation were interconnected. He stated, “even 
though ‘people’ (narody) are not the same as ‘races’ (porody), nevertheless in their 
[people’s] differences one can notice physical, bodily-animalistic [features]. These, 
 
22  Lovetskii, Kratkoe rukovodstvo k poznaniiu plemen, reprinted in Russkaia rasovaia teoriia, ed. Avdeev, 
70-1. 
23  Rainbow & Tolz, 34. 
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therefore, even if partially, are also part of the ‘national’ (narodnoe).”24 After this, not only 
were the common uses of ‘race’ interchangeable, the use of nationality (narod) joined this 
kaleidoscope of terms in the delineations of group belonging and group persecution. 
A specific shift toward this usage was after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II 
by “the people” - the group who committed the murder referred to themselves as narodnaya 
volya (the people’s will). Reacting to the murder of his father, Tsar Alexander III began a 
reactionary campaign of “uniformity” in the 1880s in order to clearly determine the loyalty 
to the state of various groups around the empire. In the process of attaining this uniformity, 
also referred to as “Russification,” the refusal to accept Russian Orthodoxy, the refusal to 
speak Russian, and the refusal to adopt Slavic, russkiy culture and customs all became signs 
of disloyalty to the Tsar and the Russian Empire.25 He quickly decided that those who failed 
to adopt this uniformity became disloyal ‘others’ and the state began identifying these 
‘others’ as affiliated with certain groups (narody i porody) and penalizing entire categories 
of citizens. 
Alexander III disregarded the fact that each nationality within the empire had its 
own language, customs, and relationship to the state and that many of them refused to adopt 
this new uniformity because they viewed it as an attack on their individual national 
identities rather than a test of loyalty to the state. He only saw that those rejecting the 
uniformity policies did so upon national justification and therefore certain nationalities 
 
24  Nadezhdin, “Ob etnograficheskom izuchesnii narodnosti russkoi” (Chast’ I), Otnograficheskoe 
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25  Florinsky, Michael T. “Alexander III.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., March 
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could not be trusted. As a result, national persecution became one of the primary 
characteristics of the Tsarist state under Alexander III and visibly different nationalities 
received the most immediate repercussions simply as a result of being the easiest to identify 
as ‘other’ and, therefore, disloyal.26 
That is, through his desire for uniformity, Alexander III equated loyalty and 
‘Russianness’ to certain nationalities and a major vehicle to determine this loyalty was 
physical appearance. Therefore, visible othering became a defining factor of Tsar 
Alexander III’s reign; but since the terminology used to other these people surrounded 
“nation;” the physical (visible) differences between nationalities became a primary 
characteristic of group belonging in Russia. 
Though Alexander III’s policies were particular to Russia, each empire had a 
different relationship with racial concepts and each developed an understanding of how 
race operated within their own societal structures. In the case of the Russian Empire, as 
with other Central European empires, race became almost inseparable from nationality and, 
as seen during the Soviet Union, most efforts to separate these ideas are fruitless. 
 
Soviet Union 
 The Soviet Union inherited the legacy of national persecution from Imperial Russia 
and at first attempted to change this societal dynamic. Then, after the death of Lenin and 




national persecution but became famous for its anti-racist rhetoric and active criticism of 
the United States’ well-known struggles with racial hierarchies. But, with some analysis, 
what we actually see throughout the Soviet regime is a rhetorical attempt to be anti-racist 
while actively administering racialized practices throughout society under the guise of non-
racial (national) terminology. 
 Pre-revolution, the Bolshevik leadership under Lenin upheld the ideal of national 
self-determination and the right to secede from a proposed federation if national minorities 
saw fit to do so.27 Post-revolution, in the 1920s, the leadership developed the korenizatsiya 
(nativization) policy, which promoted the installment of representatives of national 
minorities into positions of power within their own Soviet republics. This policy was an 
attempt to reverse russkiy political, cultural, and linguistic dominance in nerusskaya 
national republics. The policy even required russkiy citizens within these republics to learn 
the local language and customs.28 
However, Stalin argued that national self-determination symbolized the 
counterrevolutionary movement. He believed that citizens were either in support of the 
proletariat or were self-deterministic bourgeois nationalists who worked in opposition of 
the working class.29 So, after the death of Lenin and Stalin’s consolidation of power, the 
policies of self-determination and korenizatsiya were retracted and the ideal “Soviet Man 
 
27  Lenin, “The Socialist Revolution and the Rights of Nations to Self-Determination.” Lenin’s Collected 
Works. Vol.22; 143-156. 
28  Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 132-181. 
29  Ibid, 211-272. 
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and Woman” were created through the process of Sovietization. This process was two-fold. 
First, russkiy citizens became the “first among equals,” meaning their language, culture, 
and customs became the dominant features of Soviet society and russkiy leaders replaced 
nerusskaya leaders in nerusskaya national republics. There was fear from the leadership in 
Moscow at the time that too much individuality between the republics would result in war 
and unifying them in this way would prevent conflicts along national lines.30 Though many 
national minorities pushed against this reverse of korenizatsiya they were unsuccessful 
against Stalin’s repressive forces and were obliged to adopt Sovietization. 
The second phase of this process was much more daunting and required 
transforming each minority into the Soviet Man and Woman. This required Soviet 
leadership to understand 1) what it means to achieve this ideal, 2) how far from it each 
citizen is (in various ways- language, behavior, clothing, etc.), and 3) how to guide 
everyone from where they are to where they need to be. The two inherent assumptions in 
this belief are that human identity is malleable enough for everyone to successfully achieve 
the ideal and that there is a categorical tethering of people to their nationality which equates 
changing the nationality with changing the people. But even with this logic, the Soviet 
leadership failed to complete all three phases of this transformation; they never moved 
beyond the second phase. By categorizing the different nationalities and analyzing their 
differences and how far away from the ideal they were, the contours of their differences 
became rigid and immutable regardless of the people’s efforts to change their identity. 
 
30  Ibid, 254. 
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Brigid O’Keeffe illustrates this problem in her study of the Roma population during 
the Soviet period. In the case of the Roma, Soviet nationality policies outwardly promoted 
the idyllic Soviet Man and Woman toward which everyone should thrive and promised to 
transform the Roma into this ideal but, in actuality, the policy “had the effect of deepening 
their ‘gypsiness’ in the process.”31 According to O’Keeffe, the Soviet leadership required 
the Roma to pronounce “one’s Gypsy self and one’s Gypsy nationality as fundamentally 
backward [and] as essentially ‘Gypsy.’” The Roma successfully integrated into Soviet 
society as citizens and adopted the customs of the Soviet Man and Woman, but they “could 
not escape the stigmatizing vision of Gypsies as a people who were nomadic, stubbornly 
marginal, swindling, and ambiguously exotic.”32 
This process was used against several national minorities and, despite individual or 
group consent, their differences, visible or not, were solidified as “Roma,” “Jewish,” or 
some other nationality and persecution followed those who did not become the perfect 
Soviet Man or Woman as a result of failing to escape these categories that they themselves 
may not have chosen. 
Similarly, Adrienne Edgar explores this tension through her study of children of 
mixed marriages born between 1950 and 1970 in the Soviet Union. Numerous participants 
interviewed stated that they felt their personal identities transcended nationality. In the 
Soviet nationality policy, citizens were compelled to select a single national identity for 
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their passport but many described what Edgar wrote as a “dilemma of belonging” wherein 
they did not fully identify with either parent’s national identity but were still forced to 
choose one. The participants almost exclusively spoke of wanting to write “Soviet” on their 
documents because it felt more natural than choosing one half of their home identity. But, 
since “Soviet” was not an option, what resulted was people choosing a nationality other 
than what they believed themselves to be based on arbitrary, less significant details.33 
This reaffirms the problem shown above of the Soviet leadership creating a societal 
ideal and forcing people into certain, pre-selected categories that determine how far away 
from the ideal a person is and how much they need to change. Edgar does not explicitly 
state that the categories of race and nationality during the Soviet Union are interchangeable, 
but she does clearly argue that nationality was deeply racialized and utilized in a similar 
fashion to race in the United States and Western Europe. She states, “people struggled 
when they looked like one nationality but felt like another because they feared others would 
not believe their claim to national belonging.”34 This racialized social stratification of the 
Soviet Union was thrust upon the citizenry and used in a manner counterproductive to the 
goal of achieving their ideal Soviet identity by locking certain groups in a national category 
for various reasons (both visual and non-visual) and restricting movement between these 
categories in order to become “Soviet.” 
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 During the Soviet period, we see that race and nation cannot necessarily be deemed 
synonymous. But several race scholars, such as Barbara Weinstein, argue that nationality 
in itself is inherently exclusive and therefore when there is an ideal national identity toward 
which citizens must strive, the boundaries of that identity become increasingly more rigid 
as more people attempt to claim it as their own. As such, creating the Soviet Man and 
Woman and basing their characteristics around russkiy culture and language all but 
solidified an unbreachable societal structure that placed the russkie at the top, those groups 
most similar (national minorities of Slavic origin) in the middle, and those groups most 
different at the bottom. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The immutability of certain characteristics of these groups and the normalization 
of their boundaries by those at the top with complete disregard for those within these groups 
mirrors the processes of racialization and racial group belonging that occurred in the United 
States and Western Europe. Viewing race as practice shows that the distinctions drawn 
between groups in Russia are a form of racism, not only nationalism, that is universal in its 
global application. This realization debunks the popular idea that the Soviet Union was a 
raceless or anti-racist society. In reality, they administered the same racial practices in their 
own society as their rivals abroad, they simply used the terminological haze surrounding 




Chapter III: Contemporary Russian White Nationalism 
On 6 April, 2020 the United States Department of State designated the Russian 
Imperial Movement (RIM) and its leaders as global terrorists,35 the first time a white 
supremacist group has earned this label from the US government. The State Department 
justified this action by citing a quote from President Trump in 2019 proclaiming, “in one 
voice, our nation must condemn racism, bigotry, and white supremacy”36 and stating that 
RIM and its leaders provide training “for acts of terrorism that threaten the national security 
and foreign policy of the United States.”37 Following this announcement, the US 
government called on other nations to stand with them against global terrorism and for the 
Russian Federation to condemn and disband this group. 
 In response, Russia criticized the United States for inadequate justification and 
using an external organization as a propaganda tool for domestic political points. The 
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova precisely stated, “since no 
intelligible and detailed information about the rationale for its decision was voiced in 
Washington, there was a feeling that it was designed primarily for an external propaganda 
effect and has little to do with the real task of jointly combating international terrorism.”38 
 
35  Pompeo, Michael R. “United States Designates Russian Imperial Movement and Leaders as Global 
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After this announcement, Russian media and scholars began reacting to the news in articles 
and social media saying that the United States should address its own white supremacist 
organizations and hate groups if it wants to address racism and bigotry.39 They asserted 
that there are more examples of greater magnitude within the United States than from 
external sources in Russia but that the Trump Administration wanted to gain political points 
by appearing anti-racist against a group that would have no negative effect on the social 
fabric of the United States; therefore, Trump appears anti-racist while gaining support from 
the most racist groups in his own nation. In a tweet replying to the Russian Foreign 
Ministry’s criticism of the State Department, one user even wrote that the United States 
does not want to blacklist its “own children.”40 
 This reaction to the United States condemning a Russian organization as racist is a 
textbook tu quoque fallacy. There was no attempt from the Russian leadership to address 
the claims made by the State Department by censoring this group or reviewing possible 
white terrorism originating from within Russia. The response from the Russian government 
and many Russian academics was to disregard the initial claim by bringing attention to the 
hypocritical position of the United States in this realm of thought. Discussing the United 
States’ relationship with race, then making a comparison of how the United States is worse 
than Russia in terms of racial treatment was used to invalidate the U.S. designation for this 
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group and assert that, through this hypocrisy, the United States is never correct in 
mentioning the racist actions of another nation or foreign organization. 
 Notwithstanding the unique experience with race in the United States, as stated in 
the introduction, there is a common perception outside of Russia that the Russian 
Federation is racist and implicitly supports racist organizations. Many people within Russia 
argue that the nation is not racist and the idea that they are is Western propaganda to 
disguise its own problems with race. This chapter will examine five of the most prominent 
white nationalist groups in the Russian Federation in order to establish differences and 
similarities amongst them, how they are situated within the narrative of global white 
nationalism, how they use the concept of race, if at all, and how open they are in Russian 
society. These groups range from political parties to non-political organizations, and 
include political parties that became non-political organizations as well as non-political 
organizations that became political parties. Because the main objective of this thesis is to 
discuss the common ideologies of Russian nationalism, as opposed to the processes of how 
these groups formed, I do not differentiate between these categories of white nationalist 
groups. 
Furthermore, I am only researching those groups that were prominent after the year 
2000 and are still relevant to the larger Russian nationalist movement in 2020. In this 
regard, the thesis does not take into account federal leadership changes, skips the rampant 
instability of the 1990s, and requires a sustained relevance of these groups through major 
geopolitical events within the 21st century; such as Putin’s 2007 speech, Russia’s wars in 
both Georgia and Ukraine, Russia’s active presence in Syria, and the Covid-19 pandemic. 
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Therefore, the groups Pamyat and Rodina, which were the largest nationalist groups after 
the fall of the Soviet Union and have been included in many contemporary Russian 
nationalist articles and studies,4142 are omitted from this thesis. Many of the groups 
examined are splinters of one of these two parties, so the ideological underpinnings of the 
two are represented within the analysis, but there will be no specific examination of either 
Pamyat or Rodina since they do not meet the aforementioned criteria. 
 Finally, this chapter is not an in-depth analysis of any of these five groups; an 
analysis of each group could be a study in itself. Instead, this chapter is a general overview 
of these five groups meant to answer the following questions: 1) Who are these people? 2) 
What is their ideology? 3) Where and how strong is their online presence? 4) What are the 
social structures and hierarchies for which each of these groups advocates? Their 
similarities will then be compared to determine if Russian nationalist groups share a 
particular logic that makes their presence and sustainability both possible and probable in 
the Russian Federation. 
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RUSSIAN WHITE NATIONALIST GROUPS 
Russian National Unity       
The first of the five groups examined is the organization Russian National Unity 
(RNU). This group is both a neo-Nazi political party and a paramilitary organization based 
in Moscow and led by the ultranationalist Aleksander Barkashov. Though created in 1990, 
the group has modernized with the 21st century and has an active online presence on its 
own platform and on Russian social media. Their rusnation.org website includes the history 
of the organization, ways in which to contact the group, links to their radio shows, articles, 
books, and other associated sites, and a forum where members can discuss various topics 
ranging from increasing youth masculinity to the government’s role in advancing their 
objectives.  
Their social media pages all push the idea that Russia should be the moral police 
for the world. On their VKontakte page,43 the first line states, “our people are chosen to 
preserve True Orthodoxy in the world until the Second Coming [of Jesus Christ].”44 In 
addition to this, the main slogan for the group is ‘Russia for Russians’45 but they only 
advocate for the outright expulsion of minorities whose national or ethnic origin is outside 
of the Russian Federation- such as South Caucasians (those from Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan), Central Asians (those from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
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Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), Jews, the Roma, and blacks (both Africans and those of 
African descent from Western Europe, North America, and Latin America). The group 
does not differentiate between immigrants and those with a foreign national and ethnic 
origin born within the Russian Federation; they believe that all minorities whose national 
or ethnic origin is outside of the formal borders of Russia must leave.  
Those who are not russkiy but whose ethnic origin is within the borders of the 
Russian Federation (Siberia, the Far East, North Caucasus, etc.) are considered 
“compatriots”and are allowed to live in Russia but must remain within the borders of their 
ancestral home and never have interethnic or interracial marriages that will erode the 
dominant Russian ethnicity. Further, this group desires to maintain a social hierarchy 
amongst the nationalities. Reminiscent of Russians during the Soviet Union as the “first 
among equals,” RNU argues that while these groups may remain in Russia, the russkiy 
ethnicity is the default federal identity and the most important group within the country.46 
Within the organization there is a clear social hierarchy in which different ranks 
have different responsibilities and maintain visibility for the group in various ways. This 
hierarchy is intended both as a structural framework for the group, but also to give the 
members order, stability, and ideals for which to strive as they become “true men”. New 
recruits, referred to as “storonniki” (supporters) hand out flyers to the general public, attend 
information sessions on group ideology, transport leaders around their specific cities, and 
other low-level jobs. Those who advance from this level are “spodvizhniki” (companions). 
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These members are allowed to wear the organization insignia- an embellishment of the 
traditional Nazi swastika- and they participate in paramilitary training, which includes 
everything from handling a firearm and target practice to outdoor survival and hand-to-
hand combat. In this level, the members learn how to be “real” Russian men and represent 
the true, dying breed of man that Western liberal democracies try to eradicate. The final 
level of membership, reserved for the most dedicated members, are referred to as 
“soratniki” (associates) and they serve as leaders within the organization.47 
In all three levels, the group has partnered with businesses, military services, and 
state officials in various ways and at times they accompany police officers on their nightly 
patrols of their cities. The relationship between the state apparatus and RNU solidified 
specifically after the organization’s assistance in Eastern Ukraine with the war in Donbas.48 
Though they sometimes criticize the “multiculturalism” of the federal government, they 
have not broken any federal laws and are therefore allowed certain privileges.  
 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
 The second group is one of the most well-known political parties in the Russian 
Federation: the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). Led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky 
and based in Moscow, this group has the largest formal membership of all five groups 
examined in this paper with official numbers surpassing 295,000 in 2019.49 The main 
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slogan for the party is ‘Freedom, Patriotism, Law’ and they advocate for a “revival of 
Russia as a great power” and an imperial reconquest of the near abroad, mainly the former 
Soviet republics.50 While the RNU calls for all nerusskie to leave, the LDPR believes that 
nerusskie from the near abroad may remain in the Russian Federation because Russia’s 
“natural borders” include Transcaucasia, Central Asia, Belarus, and Ukraine. However, 
they maintain that russkie are the dominant group and all others should be subservient to 
the needs and objectives of this superior group.  
The group does believe, however, that the existence of national republics in Russia- 
that is, the politically concentrated presence of ethnic minorities such as Chechens, 
indigenous peoples of Siberia, Kamchatkans, etc.- undermines the territorial unity of the 
entire Russian Federation. In online discussions, many members expressed the belief that 
“some citizens and territories live and exist at the expense of others” and that the russkiy 
citizens were unfairly supporting many of the other nationalities through their subsidization 
of these unnecessary national republics.51 This, they believe, is a form of discrimination 
against the russkie as it supports a fiscal favoritism for the other nationalities but does not 
economically advance the russkie. Furthermore, the leadership of the party asserts that the 
russkie are being “squeezed out of the executive and legislative branches and lose their job 
positions” in various fields in order to accommodate these nationalities. They argue that 
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this displacement is the primary “ethnic crime” against the russkie as the “superior” ethnic 
group within the Federation.52 
Similar to the RNU, this organization has an active online presence both in Russian 
media (VKontakte and Telegram) and in Western media (Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, 
etc.). They pride themselves on being one of the oldest nationalist groups in contemporary 
Russia and for providing their members a place in which to share their beliefs, qualms, and 
ideals together. Also, as a participating party in the Duma,53 they have a formal legitimacy 
that many of the other organizations have failed to achieve. They use this legitimacy to 
further the social superiority of the russkiy citizenry and present their vision of Russia as 
the patriotic, national vision for everyone. 
 
Russian Imperial Movement 
 As previously mentioned, this third group made international headlines in early 
2020 as the first white supremacist/white nationalist organization labelled as a global 
terrorist group by the United States Department of State. The Russian Imperial Movement 
(RIM) is an ultranationalist, far-right paramilitary organization based in St. Petersburg and 
led by Stanislav Vorobyev. RIM is more similar to RNU than LDPR in its actions around 
Russia, but its ideology differs drastically. Their main ideology is ‘Orthodox Imperial 
Nationalism,’ and their primary belief, building on the popular Duginist and Eurasianist 
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53  The Duma is the legislative branch of the Russian Federation; equal to the parliaments of Western 
Europe. 
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ideologies widely accepted in Russia today, is that Orthodox Christianity and the russkiy 
people are the basis of and future for Christianity and a morally just society, writ large.54 
 On their webpage, the organization writes that it aims to “exclude the rot of 
liberalism and democracy in the political, moral, and national issues of modern Russia”55 
through community education and protection in three primary fields: 1) political and 
religious education- the teachings of Orthodoxy, monarchism, and Christian nationalism; 
2) the preservation of core Russian interests- traditional values, political/spiritual/cultural 
expansion, anti-illegal immigration, and anti-Russophobia; and 3) the defense of 
Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church- against proselytism, heretics, and other 
schisms within the church. The group garners much of its inspiration from the Black 
Hundreds- an early 20th century ultranationalist group that incited pogroms, pushed 
russkiy-centric doctrines, and advocated the subjugation of all others, especially Ukrainians 
and Jews- and pushed for a return to the pre-Soviet russkiy dominance of the Near Abroad56 
and the expulsion of all “others” from Russian territory, namely Jews, blacks, and the 
Roma. 
 The specific paramilitary branch of the organization is called the Imperial Legion 
and has two large sporting facilities in St. Petersburg in which the members train any 
Russian men who, according to their website, “believe that, in modern Russia, not to be a 
 
54  “РУССКОЕ ИМПЕРСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ.” Accessed July 26, 2020. 
https://public.wikireading.ru/115358. 
55  “Русское Имперское Движение.” Telegram. Accessed July 26, 2020. https://t.me/s/Rus_imperia. 
56  The fourteen post-Soviet states excluding Russia that constitute much of Russia’s surrounding territory. 
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warrior is a criminal weakness.”57 They teach hand-to-hand combat, combat survival, 
outdoor survival techniques, and many other topics in order to increase the virility of 
Russian masculinity that is threatened by the West and the pervasiveness of 
multiculturalism and other “effeminate” cultures.58 In addition to these basic survival and 
combat needs, they teach urban assault and tactical training with advanced weaponry to 
their attendees.  
After solidifying these courses, in an attempt to assert russkiy superiority over other 
European nations in a manner that mirrors imperial civilizing missions, they opened their 
facilities to white men across Central and Eastern Europe. Attendees of these training 
courses have gone on to bomb and attack civilian urban centers in Western Europe that 
house the perceived enemies of RIM and its ideology.  
The most publicized attack of RIM training attendees was the 2016 Gothenburg 
attack in Sweden where a group of Swedish men committed a series of bombings in 
Gotherburg that targeted a refugee shelter, a shelter for asylum seekers, and a popular cafe. 
Three of the perpetrators were arrested and subsequently convicted and Swedish 
prosecutors found that the bombers credited RIM for their “terrorist radicalization and 
relevant training.”59 This decision, according to the official U.S. State Department website, 
began the U.S. government’s initial investigation into the organization and after finding 
that RIM has provided this paramilitary training to white supremacists across Central and 
 
57 “Русское Имперское Движение.” VK. Accessed July 26, 2020. https://vk.com/rus_imperia. 
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59  The Local. “Trio Locked Up Over Gothenburg Bomb Attacks.” thelocal.se, July 7, 2017. 
https://www.thelocal.se/20170707/trio-locked-up-over-gothenburg-bomb-attacks-sweden-neo-nazi. 
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Eastern Europe, including Germany, Poland, and Finland, they actively decided to label 
this group as a terrorist organization.60 
 The official website of RIM is blocked on US internet servers, but the group 
maintains an open presence on Telegram, VKontakte, and other open forum websites to 
espouse their views and allow a space for their followers to also express themselves on 
whatever topic they deem necessary. Common topics include the perceived attacks on 
masculinity from Western culture, the divergence of the Russian people from Christian 
values, the role of the state in achieving these ideals, and more. While RIM and RNU seem 
almost identical with their beliefs and domestic paramilitary action, the RNU is specifically 
a neo-Nazi organization and supports the ideology of global national socialism. RIM draws 
its inspiration from Imperial Russia- particularly, the final decades of the regime that 
institutionalized Russification and ultranationalism- a desire to reinstate this imperial 
order, and the belief that German Nazism is inferior to Russian imperial might. 
 
Great Russia Party 
 The fourth group is the Great Russia Party (denoted ‘VR’ from its latinized form, 
‘Velikaya Rossiya’). VR is an ultranationalist, far-right political party that is often 
associated with neo-Nazism, even though their ideology makes no official mention of 
national socialism.61 The Moscow-based group was formed by leaders of three other 
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organizations- Rodina, the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, and the Congress of 
Russian Communities- and is currently led by Andrei Saveliyev. The most important of 
these ‘parent’ groups for this study is the Movement Against Illegal Immigration. This 
group also adopted the slogan ‘Russia for Russians’ and advocated specifically against 
Caucasians and Central Asians who they deemed criminals. In 2011, the organization was 
officially banned by the High Court of the Russian Federation due to its members’ active 
roles in violent protests against the presence of foreigners and the government’s use of 
foreign workers and the group’s relentless efforts to incite intragroup hatred between 
russkie and national and ethnic minorities. However, after the 2011 court decision, most of 
the members joined VR and continue to influence its actions and ideology in 2020.62 
 The overall ideology of the party is not unique from the first three groups; rather, it 
is an amalgamation of the larger points already explained. ‘Russia for Russians,’ Russian 
Orthodoxy as the purest religion, and a superiority of russkiy citizens are the three main 
ideological pillars for the party. But while VR’s ideology itself does not differ significantly 
from the aforementioned groups, the organization is unique because of its advocacy for a 
different form of public engagement. The members criticize the other organizations for 
advancing ideologies and rhetoric that is “alien to Russians” and subsequently losing vital 
support for the overall cause. That is, VR believes that the other groups’ messaging is not 
 
62  “Партия.” Партия | Великая Россия, March 1, 2020. http://velikoross.org/category/partiya. 
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palpable to the overall russkiy population and they fail to garner as much support as 
possible through their refusal to appeal more to the larger russkiy community.63 
Instead, the party presents a logic that equates patriotism to nationalism; it argues 
that, in order to be a true Russian patriot, one must be a Russian nationalist- meaning they 
must support the aforementioned ideologies. Framing the problem in more palpable 
language and simple logic for the general public will garner more support for a common 
russkiy superior objective, rather than dissuade people from the cause. 
 In this regard, their online presence is vital for their sustainability. On their website, 
they have an active forum where individuals- both members and non-members- are 
encouraged to discuss any and all topics related to Russian nationalism. Racial and ethnic 
phenotypes, government action, the presence of nerusskie throughout the Federation, and 
other topics are explored and argued on the forum. For example, there is a running 
conversation on the forum about the sustainability of whiteness and the russkiy identity in 
a world of multiculturalism and a call to safeguard the white race from destruction.64 Some 
of the most fascinating statements and points of debate are around the importance of a pan-
European whiteness into which the russkie should invest and lead, and also around the 
condemnation and/or criminalization of those in interethnic or interracial relationships and 
birthing children with diluted russkiy blood. 
 
63  “Предзаказы На Книгу Андрея Савельева ‘Русская Идеология.’” Великая Россия, January 28, 
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64  “КАК РАСОВО ОЧИСТИТЬ РУССКУЮ НАЦИЮ.” как расово очистить русскую нацию | 
Русский Портал. Accessed July 26, 2020. http://bb.velikoross.org/forums/topic/kak-rasovo-ochistit-
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Since this particular conversation has been running since 2013 there are numerous 
tangents and breakaway conversations that could be a source of further analysis in another 
study. But the most important takeaway from this example is how the forum serves as a 
platform for individuals to explore different ideas and engage in debates about the 
boundaries of their respective white identities, the hierarchies they create, and how to 
intellectually spread this ideology amongst their comrades. In fact, the party itself explicitly 
argues that this open source for ideas, and the intermittent explanation from party members 
using science and logic, advances their goals more effectively than preaching about 
theoretical ideals and comparing intangible systems.65 If people understand the logic, they 
will follow more readily than if they do not. The party must operate outside of its current 
stance in order to convince those who do not explicitly agree with the ideas and actions 
espoused by the group but are open to persuasion. 
 
Russian National Socialist Party 
 The final, and arguably most extreme, of the five groups is the Russian National 
Socialist Party (RNSP). Created after one of the Pamyat members separated from the larger 
group, this party is based in Moscow and was led by Konstanin Kasimovsky. The group 
has four main ideological principles: 1) a strong state; 2) “aggressive Russian nationalism;” 
3) non-Marxist socialism; and 4) Orthodox Christianity; though there has been a significant 
push to distance the group from an emphasis on Orthodoxy, it remains one of the central 
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tenets for the party today.66 Within these four main principles, the RNSP outlined eight 
objectives as well that include the “spiritual and biological healing of the ‘russkiy nation’, 
the purity of russkiy culture and language, strengthening the family, establishing moral 
censorship [and] creating a new community of russkiy people.”67 
 The reason this group is the most extreme is because their believed superiority and 
hatred toward foreigners led some members to execute foreign and nerusskie domestic 
students by beheading them. Group members later published the videos of their actions in 
order to bring attention to Russia’s need for stricter immigration laws.68 The other groups 
hold violent ideals and promote certain actions- some of which came to fruition outside of 
the Russian Federation, see RIM- but they have not resorted to vigilante violence as a 
means to achieve their respective goals. Though the men who claimed the murders named 
their group the “Militant Organization of Russian Nationalists” and the photograph of one 
student’s severed head was sent to the Sova Center by this group,69 two of the victims are 
heard in their execution video saying, “we were arrested by Russian national socialists” 
before they were shot, stabbed, and beheaded.70 
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 As a result of these actions, the group remains hidden from public view and it does 
not have open social media accounts for public access. But there is a common belief that 
these groups operate online in private forums and coded chat rooms to signal one another. 
Unfortunately, I was not able to infiltrate the groups because my fake profile was not 
adequate enough for membership; however, they are present if one knows where to search 
and how to adequately convince the leadership of one’s dedication.71 
 
CONCLUSION 
 While there is plenty of overlap between these groups in the different ideals for 
which they advocate, there are significant differences between them as well. But before we 
begin the comparison, it is important to note that when examining these types of groups we 
need to remain aware of the complexities of racism and nationalism. These groups can be 
labeled ‘racist’ and ‘nationalist,’ but it is then necessary to unpack how these labels operate 
in a specific Russian context and the implications that follow those labels within that 
context. 
 Avoiding any official labels, what we see is that each of these groups diverge on 
how Russia should be governed (through fascism, monarchy, orthodoxy, etc.) but they 
overlap in two particular areas. First, it is important to consider their use of hierarchies of 
national and ethnic identities and their treatment of the nerusskaya undesirables. For 
 
71  This begs the question, why did the U.S. State Department label RIM a terrorist organization, but not 
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example, some groups believe that people from Ukraine and Belarus deserve more 
privileges than non-Slavic peoples while others believe that only the russkie should enjoy 
widespread societal privileges. But, paying attention to non-Slavic minorities, the role of 
national minorities is similar throughout all five groups. Russkiy is at the top of all five 
societal structures and the ‘undesirables’ trickle down the hierarchy variously. 
 The second overlap for these groups is the importance of masculinity for their 
members. Most of the groups discuss how multiculturalism and Western ideas are an attack 
on traditional gender roles and that the proper way of life is for men to become physically 
strong, train in combat, and reject all forms of femininity. While this second area of overlap 
is fascinating and deserves further research and analysis, this study focuses on the first area 
of overlap and not the second.  
With this in mind, and using the historical understanding from chapter one, the next 
chapter will demonstrate how Russia’s use of national minorities in social hierarchies 
mirrors other societies’ treatment of racial minorities. In other words, racism is pervasive 
in Russian society, just as it is in the United States, South Africa, Brazil, and other largely 
heterogeneous societies. One of the main differences in Russia is not a lack of racism, but 
a lack of formal racial language that allows openly racist groups, such as those examined 




Chapter IV: Contemporary Racialization of Nationality 
This chapter compares racialized group differences in the United States and Russian 
Federation to demonstrate how the current processes of racialization in both countries are 
mirror images of one another, even though the United States explicitly uses the word ‘race’ 
and the Russian Federation explicitly uses the word ‘nationality.’ This is not an assertion 
that the United States and Russian Federation are exactly the same in their uses of race; 
rather, it serves to show how there remains a racial logic in Russia even without the explicit 
use of racial terminology. 
 
GLOBAL RACIALIZATION OF NATIONALITY 
The most useful framework for understanding contemporary racialized nationalism 
is provided by political scientist Ashley Jardina in her 2019 book White Identity Politics. 
She works specifically within a US context but her ideas transcend racial regionalization 
because she provides clear and concise theories and examples of how nationality is 
racialized and then weaponized against those races and/or nationalities deemed 
undesirable.  
One of the main themes Jardina uses in her study to discuss this process is the 
relationship between whiteness and a particular conception of national identity.72 
Whiteness in the United States is typically synonymous with ‘American,’ similar to the 
connection of  whiteness to ‘English’ or ‘Russian’ (russkiy) in their respective nations. In 
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turn, the dominant identity of these nations is defined by whiteness. So, most white 
Americans, Brits, Russians, etc. view themselves as the prototypical members of their 
respective nations, meaning they set the framework for social structures and determine 
which privileges certain groups receive as a result of their proximity to this prototypicality. 
It follows then that “the relationship between national identity and racial identity [is] 
somewhat symbiotic.”73 In other words, higher levels of white identity are associated with 
higher levels of American, British, or Russian identity. Therefore, to be white is to be 
American and to be russkiy is to be Russian. 
Jardina’s framework is useful for this analysis because people who view themselves 
as the prototypical members of a group or nation are more likely to insist upon strict 
boundaries defining this group or nation.74 These “hard” boundaries support a particular, 
normative idea of who represents a “true” national. They often include characteristics that 
people either cannot change or have difficulty changing: place of birth, native language, 
practicing Christianity, or being white. While there are also “soft” boundaries that less 
prototypical members of a group or nation may hold- obtaining citizenship, respecting the 
laws and norms of the nation in question, or ‘feeling’ American, British, Russian, etc., most 
white nationalist and white supremacist groups explicitly advocate for more distinct and 
unbridegable boundaries around national identity.  
In addition to this solidification of the borders of the ideal, Jardina finds that white 
racial solidarity also has a deep influence on beliefs of group competition. Controlling for 
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outgroup animus, she finds that those who have a strong sense of white (dominant, 
prototypical) identity almost exclusively believe that 1) more jobs for racial minorities 
means fewer jobs for white people, regardless of what the job is; 2) more political influence 
racial minorities have means white people have less influence; and, inversely, 3) less 
political and social influence racial minorities have means white people have more 
influence, which they believe is how life should be governed.75 
Jardina’s themes provide a framework against which to measure the internal white 
identity politics of any given nation. In the case of the Russian Federation, using the five 
groups from chapter two, by replacing ‘white’ with ‘russkiy’ and ‘racial minorities’ with 
‘national minorities’ we see that the processes Jardina details in the United States are the 
exact same processes used in the Russian Federation only with a slightly different 
vocabulary. 
There are two primary beliefs about the dynamic of russkiy vs nerusskaya peoples 
which all five of the white nationalist groups hold as truth; first, the sense that russkiy 
citizens are victims of minority encroachment. This sentiment is held against both visible 
and non-visible minorities and against domestic (North Caucasians, Siberians, Central 
Asians, Jews, etc.) and foreign minorities (blacks, Latinx, East and Southeast Asians, etc.). 
The most common manifestation of this victimhood is in the resentment held by these 
groups against migrant workers from Central Asia and people from the North Caucasus for 
“stealing” jobs and opportunities away from the russkie. A major objective of the ‘Russia 
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for Russians’ platform is the expulsion of these nerusskaya workers from the nation in 
order to increase opportunities for those who “deserve” them.76 This falls directly into 
Jardina’s point on perceived group competition. These nationalist groups do not account 
for the russkiy refusal to work menial jobs nor for the possibility of expanding or 
restructuring the oligarchic system. For them, the problems of poverty and disparity in 
Russia are the fault of these outsiders who do not belong.  
Similarly, Jews are also blamed for the multitude of problems in the Russian 
economy. Conspiracies about Jewish-owned businesses secretly running the world are not 
unique to Russia, but many Jewish-owned businesses throughout Russia are frequently 
vandalized and the Jewish owners attacked.77 The presence of these Jewish businesses in 
russkiy-dominant areas is seen by these white nationalist groups as a Jewish attempt to 
overrun russkiy businesses and economic opportunities. So, to them, the best way to ensure 
russkiy economic growth and safety is to eliminate the nerusskaya competition. 
This belief that all other groups are in competition with the russkie extends beyond 
the economy. Religious freedom, resource allocation, political office, and many other 
categories are arenas in which these groups believe the russkie are under attack and must 
defend themselves against all others because the presence of other national minorities 
threatens the status and material wealth of the russkie. But this analysis focuses specifically 
 




on the economic factors because they are tangible outside of the russkiy vs. nerusskaya 
dichotomy.  
The second common idea amongst the five groups from chapter two is about how 
the russkiy people represent Christian purity and how the dilution of this purity is, among 
other things, akin to sinful. The maintenance of this perceived purity is almost exclusively 
tied to the persecution of visible minorities. Central Asians and blacks, those whose 
physical difference is most apparent, receive the largest number of interpersonal physical 
and verbal attacks from members of these groups.78 As stated above, Central Asians are 
attacked on economic lines, but they are also visibly easier to identify than Jews and other 
white or Slavic nerusskie. The presence of these people, especially in Moscow, sullies the 
image of Russia as the third Roman Empire that must hold the mantle of world leader until 
the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. To these white nationalist groups, particularly those 
tied to Imperial Russia and/or the Orthodox Church, the russkie were chosen by God for 
their purity; therefore, mixing with others dilutes this purity and threatens the future of all 
Christianity. 
Similarly, Caucasians are also often attacked in northwest and central-west Russia 
and told to “go home.”79 Once again, the white nationalists shouting these orders disregard 
reality by ignoring the fact that North Caucasians are citizens of the Russian Federation 
and, therefore, are home in these instances. But, as stated above, white nationalist groups 





russkiy purity. Russia is a federation with multiple ethnic and national minorities, but these 
groups believe that the russkie must occupy the top tier of the social hierarchy and all others 
exist within varying degrees of closeness to the russkie depending on ethnicity, language, 
religion, and all of the other factors created under Alexander III’s “uniformity” and 
subsequently reinvigorated under the Sovietization policies. 
This second idea falls under Jardina’s framework concerning boundaries. 
According to these groups, the contours of russkiy (or, in this instance, Christian purity) 
are unbreachable and must not be altered by the presence or interference of others. This 
normative idea of “pure” and “good” mirrors common American ideas of purity, 
particularly pre-2010s. In the United States, ‘russkiy’ becomes ‘white’ and ‘national 
minority’ becomes’ racial minority’, but the process and results are the exact same. There 
is a dominant group who has historically tied its own identity to the prototypical identity 
of the political entity and the efforts of minorities to infiltrate or change this identity or the 
characteristics that create it are met with intense resistance by certain groups whose main 
objective is upholding the supremacy of the dominant group. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Russian experience with race and racial concepts is unique insofar as the 
terminology Russian society has and continues to use differs from that of many other 
racialized societies around the world. But, similar to other racialized societies, there exist 
racialized structural hierarchies that define Russian society and allow for white supremacist 
groups to advocate the continued structural and systemic dominance of the russkie over 
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ethnic and national minorities. Meanwhile, the state continues asserting a type of 
nationalist discourse that is often framed as raceless and/or devoid of race and racism. The 
confusion of the past briefly outlined in chapter one and the constant need to define itself 
against the West has allowed for Russia to occupy this seemingly obvious cognitive 
dissonance; but, they are in no way an aberration of racial logic. Understanding this history 
and the current trajectory of racialized hierarchies in Russia helps enrich the conversation 
of global racisms and forces race scholars to remove ourselves from the normative 
structures provided by the United States, South Africa, Nazi Germany, and others. Race is 
pervasive in every society in different ways and we must be open to understanding this 
logic in each relative societal structure. Russia’s logic, though difficult to follow at certain 
times, clearly demonstrates that there is racism outwardly practiced in the Russian 
Federation, contrary to the popular misconceptions provided by the Russian government 
and some Russian scholars.  
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
The argument outlined in the preceding chapters points to the idea that, in Russia, 
only the use of explicitly racist language can be considered an act of racism; race as practice 
seems less important than race as a concept. But, there is an understanding of racist 
behavior separate from explicit racist language when discussing other societies. For 
example, the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States was a topic of major debate 
in Russian academic, political, and social media discourses following the murder of Geroge 
Floyd in May 2020. We see through this example that there are different metrics by which 
certain Russian actors measure global racism and domestic racism, even though the actions 
of both may mirror one another. The reaction of the Russian far-right (the most 
“nationalist” end of the political spectrum in Russia) is briefly detailed below. 
 The far-right reaction consists of the creation of the hashtag ‘RussianLivesMatter’ 
as a form of comparative victimhood and the creation of various racist internet memes 
criticizing the Black Lives Matter movement. Overall, the Russian far-right is anti-Black 
Lives Matter for two primary reasons: 1) the belief that black Americans have no right to 
complain because Russians have also suffered, and 2) the conflation of the Black Lives 
Matter protests with looting and assertion that black Americans are shouting ‘racism’ as a 
way to escape punishment for their illegal actions.  
First, the creation of #RussianLivesMatter by Russian libertarian Mikhail Svetov 
was meant to bring attention to the killing of a man by police in the central Russian town 
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of Yekaterinburg.80 The hashtag was written specifically in English as a dog whistle 
message against police brutality in Russia, but when translated into the Russian language, 
the word russkiy is used, not rossiysky. This movement in itself is used to demonstrate how 
the russkiy suffer more than other groups, including black Americans. In fact, on a twitter 
thread about this topic a user wrote about how the world is upset about black Americans 
but no one wants to show solidarity for the russkiy man killed in Yekaterinburg or other 
murders of the russkie.81 Svetov himself wrote, “how is it safer for blacks in the United 
States than for russkie in Russia?”82 Similar to the theme of victimhood in the ideologies 
of some of the white nationalist groups from chapter two, Svetov and the supporters of 
#RussianLivesMatter use this victimization in order to place their own group above 
everyone else. In this instance, the idea is that the russkie have a more difficult experience 
than black Americans and therefore black Americans have no right to complain, cause 
problems in their own country, and garner international support. 
 The second reason for the reaction of the Russian far-right is shown below in a 
number of racist memes which were harvested from various Russian social media accounts 
that argue that black Americans are stealing and destroying property and only scream 
“racism” when held accountable for their actions. The most popular category of these 
memes is called, “ты что расист?” (“are you a racist?”) in which black Americans are 
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depicted breaking laws and being unreasonable and then labeling the white people who 
address their behavior as racists. This clearly is a conflation of the Black Lives Matter 
movement with the looting and rioting that occurred at the same time in the United States, 
but it has gained popularity among the Russian far-right social media pages. The logic is 
as follows: the Black Lives Matter protests began after the murder of George Floyd, the 
police forces in various cities reacted negatively against the protests, the rioting and looting 
began in the wake of these tensions, and therefore Black Lives Matter caused the 
destruction and theft of private and public property. The implication here is that black is 
bad and white is good, which is perfectly personified in the final meme. In this meme, as 
George Floyd’s soul is leaving his body it questions why people are destroying the country 
and the caption above it reads “his soul is definitely white.”83  
 
Figure 1: black caricature asks, “Are you a 
racist?” White caricature says, “yes.”84 
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Figure 2: White caricature asks, “Hey what are 
you doing? Why are you setting fire to my car? 
What does my private property have to do with 
it? How will my burned-out car help you catch a 
police officer?” The black caricatures ask, 








Figure 3: George Floyd’s soul asks, “The police 
officer is already behind bars, why are you 
destroying your own country?” The caption 









I briefly discussed this reaction to Black Lives Matter to demonstrate how the 
Russian racial logic does not disregard all forms of racism. There is a threshold in Russia 
upon which racism is determined just as there is in every other society. But for Russia, as 
demonstrated above, the threshold for domestic racism is separate from that of global 
racism. 
There is a particular history of the way race and nationality are understood in Russia 
that creates a conceptual murkiness which allows Russians to practice exclusionary politics 
against minorities without understanding these practices as being racist. But racism is not 
about using clear racist language, it is a series of exclusionary practices that include 
systemic, systematic, and interpersonal inequality and violence. When looking at what 
kinds of practices are commonly used to attack other races globally, they are exactly the 
practices we see used in Russia today. In other words, Russia is just as racist as the United 
States, Western Europe, and Brazil, but it has managed to disguise this racism by not using 
the terminology typically associated with racism. 
But race and racism are not limited to the common etymology we ascribe to them. 
There are actions and behaviors that accompany social hierarchies on the basis of biological 
difference which are intended to assert the dominance of one group over another. 
Intellectual capacity and moral tendency are conflated with cultural characteristics and 
biological features in order to create collective identities. Then, the categorization of entire 
groups of people based on this fusion of individual agency and immutable group difference 
allows those within the dominant group to assign worth to groups beneath them with little 
option for lower groups to challenge or change this label and the status associated with it. 
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In Russia, these boundaries are delineated alongside perceptions of national 
difference, but the process is similar to countries that create these boundaries alongside 
perceptions of racial difference. This does not mean that Russia is void of racism, it simply 
means that Russia’s racial logic uses different terminology than other countries to create 
and signal the boundaries of its social hierarchy. The russkie are the dominant group and 
all other national minorities are placed in varying degrees below them in society and face 
a variety of discrimination based on this status. 
However, the explicit use of nationality instead of race allows for individuals and 
groups to commit violence against minorities and foreigners without it being labeled 
racism. This is what happened in the aftermath of my attack in Vladivostok. Russia’s racial 
logic did not deem the petting, spitting on, or choking of a black American by a russkiy 
man as racist; if anything, it was a nationalist attack as a result of my being American, but 
not a racist attack. This explains the overwhelming reaction by the Russians who said that 
my attack was not the result of racism. To them, this man was not racist because racism 
requires explicitly racist language; this man did not call me a racial slur nor did he explicitly 
discuss my skin tone, therefore, Russian racial logic excludes this interaction from the label 
of racism. 
I am not naive enough to believe that this thesis, or any study of this fashion, will 
change the interactions between white nationalists in Russia and visibly different racial 
minorities, or that it will stop another black American from experiencing what I did. What 
this does show, however, is that race, racism, and nationality require a much wider 
understanding from those with the power to enact such changes. It is our responsibility as 
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intellectuals and leaders to create a larger dialogue surrounding these ideas and their 
manifestations as sources of collective identity and collective oppression. Policy must be 
created with the explicit knowledge that racism is perpetuated in various ways and areas of 
life. Race is a social construction with real, tangible consequences. We must understand 
that just as the United States is not unique in its treatment of “others,” nor are the places 
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